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CONFRONTATION AND KABUKI 
David Alan Sklansky* 
There is an old Jewish joke about a man who takes his 
mother to a fancy restaurant and later asks her what she thought 
of the meal. “It was fine,” she says, “what there was of it.” 
“Were the portions too skimpy?” the son asks. “Oh,” his 
mother responds, “there was plenty . . . such as it was.” 
Reading the Supreme Court’s recent decision interpreting 
and applying the Confrontation Clause can make you feel a little 
like the son in that story. You begin to wonder what parts of the 
argument deserve to be taken seriously. But the ambiguity isn’t 
about quantity versus quality. It has to do with the significance 
of original intent. 
Beginning with Crawford v. Washington,1 the Supreme 
Court’s confrontation jurisprudence has been famously and quite 
explicitly originalist. The Court has insisted that the 
Confrontation Clause should be interpreted as it was originally 
understood—no matter how inconvenient or unjust the results 
may now seem. At the same time, the Court has suggested in its 
jurisprudence that the result dictated by an originalist reading of 
the Confrontation Clause is not, actually, inconvenient or unjust. 
Mirabile dictu, the originalist reading always turns out to be the 
best reading on policy grounds as well—the reading, that is to 
say, that best promotes what might be thought to be the 
underlying purposes of the Confrontation Clause while also 
taking account of considerations of administrability and 
practicality. There is no hard choice, the Court continues to 
rediscover, between originalism and pragmatism.  
All of this raises questions about how sincere and how 
                                                          
* Yosef Osheawich Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 
School of Law. 
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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meaningful it is when the Court appeals to history in its 
confrontation decisions. Originalism lacks cash value if it never 
leads the Court to results it would otherwise avoid: “[i]f 
originalism never requires judges to reach results that they 
would not reach using some other theory, it does no independent 
work.”2 The extended discussions of common-law precedents in 
the confrontation cases begin to look like rhetorical kabuki, a bit 
of stylized theater to dress up what are really, at bottom, 
arguments about something else entirely. 
Were it only so. If debates about original meaning were just 
ceremonial, they would do little damage. They would be 
irrelevant to the main event, disconnected, like a cartoon before 
the feature film. But the rhetorical kabuki in confrontation cases 
is more complicated—more like the Jewish mother’s complaints 
about the restaurant. It involves shifting repeatedly between two 
modes of discourse—one pragmatic and one historical—in a way 
that avoids the need for either set of arguments to bear the full 
weight of the Court’s conclusions. 
To get a feel for the rhetorical back-and-forth, it is helpful to 
compare the oral arguments in the Court’s recent confrontation 
cases with the opinions later released in these cases. I will do 
that in the first part of this essay. (Focusing on oral argument is 
a little artificial, of course. What about the briefs? But bear with 
me. I will get to them later.) The pattern in the oral arguments 
and the decisions is complicated: sometimes the argument 
focused on policy and the opinions on history; sometimes the 
opposite; sometimes both focused on history; and sometimes 
both seemed more concerned with policy. The second part of the 
essay will briefly discuss the implications of the rhetorical and 
methodological shifts discussed in the first part. There are 
advantages, of course, to eclecticism, and well-known reasons 
not to obsess about consistency. Sometimes what looks like an 
unwillingness to be pinned down is really a sophisticated and 
advantageous dialectic. But not always. 
                                                          
2 Louis Michael Seidman, This Essay Is Brilliant/This Essay Is Stupid: 
Positive and Negative Self-Reference in Constitutional Practice and Theory, 
46 UCLA L. REV. 501, 550 (1998). 
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I. 
When Crawford was argued before the Justices, common law 
hardly came up at all. The Court pressed the lawyers on the 
nature and implications of their positions: what precedents would 
need to be reconsidered if their arguments were accepted, and 
what future cases might come out differently? Crawford’s 
counsel referred fleetingly to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.3 
The Deputy Solicitor General appearing for the United States as 
amicus curiae was also asked about Raleigh, but only in passing, 
as the basis for a hypothetical designed to test how far the 
government would go in tying admissibility under the 
Confrontation Clause to reliability.4 Counsel for the State of 
Washington, toward the beginning of his argument, made halting 
reference to “the history surrounding the Confrontation Clause 
and how we got to have the right to confrontation,” but the 
Court did not pursue the matter.5 Virtually all of the Court’s 
questions focused on practicalities: how different tests would 
operate in practice, what it would mean to depart from or to 
adhere to the framework for confrontation analysis set forth in 
Ohio v. Roberts6—the framework that the petitioner in Crawford 
had asked the Court to reconsider, and that the Court ultimately 
abandoned. 
The Court did so in an opinion that paid far more attention 
                                                          
3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, 56, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 
02-9410). 
4 Id. at 28. Counsel for the United States responded to the inquiry by 
saying he “doubt[ed] seriously that . . . Sir Walter Raleigh’s case would 
come out differently under our approach.” Id. He meant, presumably, that 
the approach the United States was urging the Court to adopt—limiting the 
Confrontation Clause to “testimonial statements and their functional 
equivalent,” id. at 23—would condemn the outcome in Raleigh’s case, just 
like the Court’s traditional approach. He didn’t really mean that Raleigh’s 
case would come out the same way it in fact came out, with Raleigh 
convicted and sentenced to death based on an out-of-court statement provided 
by his alleged co-conspirator. But it is a sign of how little history mattered 
during the oral argument of Crawford that no one on the Court bothered to 
clarify this. 
5 Id. at 37–38. 
6 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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to history and to common-law cases than had been paid at oral 
argument. The common-law background of the Confrontation 
Clause was, in fact, the principal subject of Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the Court in Crawford: he spent considerably more 
pages discussing that history than he spent on the Court’s own 
precedents or on how the Roberts test had operated in practice. 
Justice Scalia did suggest that Roberts had worked badly: the 
results it produced were unpredictable and inconsistent. What 
was worst about those results, though, is that they diverged from 
the common-law holdings that Justice Scalia suggested the 
Confrontation Clause was intended to codify.7 The oral argument 
in Crawford was intensely practical in its focus; the Court’s 
opinion in Crawford was pointedly historical and originalist. 
Two years after deciding Crawford, the Court returned to the 
Confrontation Clause in a pair of cases consolidated for oral 
argument and decision, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. 
Indiana.8 The lawyers took their cues from Crawford, and 
common law received a fair bit of attention in the oral 
arguments of these two cases. Counsel for Davis discussed the 
treatment of “hue and cry” reports in the seventeenth century.9 
The Solicitor General’s office, appearing again as amicus curiae, 
said that a 911 call—the evidence at issue in Davis—differed 
from a Marian examination.10 Both Justice Breyer and Justice 
Scalia asked the Deputy Solicitor General about a set of 
seventeenth-century “hue and cry” cases relied upon by Davis. 
These cases suggested that reports of ongoing crimes to law 
enforcement officers were not admissible.11 Justice Scalia 
invoked Raleigh’s case when questioning counsel for the State of 
Washington.12 The lawyer for Washington, in turn, tried to focus 
the Court on whether introducing evidence from a 911 call 
“resemble[d] . . . inquisitorial abuses.”13 Counsel for Hammon 
                                                          
7 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 n.5, 63–65. 
8 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
9 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, 56–58, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 
05-5224). 
10 Id. at 43. 
11 Id. at 49–50. 
12 Id. at 29. 
13 Id. at 31–32. 
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discussed Old Bailey cases14 and the limited development of 
hearsay law in the eighteenth century.15 Counsel for Indiana 
dealt at length with Raleigh’s case, examinations by Marian 
magistrates, and the light these abuses shed on what “the 
Founders were concerned about”; his point was that questioning 
by police officers at the scene of a domestic disturbance—the 
context of the statements at issue in Hammon—differed from the 
kinds of things the Confrontation Clause was intended to 
prohibit.16 On the other hand, counsel for the United States, 
appearing as amicus curiae in Hammon, did not mention history 
or common law. His entire argument, and all of the questions 
the Court put to him, concerned the workability of a definition 
of “testimonial” that excluded statements obtained “in response 
to police questions that are reasonably necessary to determine 
whether an emergency exists.”17 This was the focus of the 
rebuttal argument by Hammon’s lawyer, too, but he couched it 
in terms of keeping “the confrontation right . . . robust, as the 
Framers intended.”18 All in all, history and common law played 
a much larger role in the Davis and Hammon arguments than 
they had when Crawford was argued before the Court. In fact, 
Indiana’s Solicitor General told the Court that the “important 
lesson from Crawford” was that in interpreting the 
Confrontation Clause the question should be “[w]hat does 
history tell us the Founders were concerned about?”19 
The Court pushed back. Justice Scalia, who wrote the 
Court’s opinions in Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, cautioned at 
oral argument against “overread[ing] Crawford” by concluding 
“that the only thing the Confrontation Clause was directed at was 
the kind of abuse that . . . occurred in the case of Sir Walter 
                                                          
14 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813 
(2006) (No. 05-5705). 
15 Id. at 20. 
16 Id. at 31–34, 36–39, 44–48. 
17 Id. at 48–59. 
18 Id. at 61; see also id. at 62–63 (suggesting that the questioning in 
Hammon “resembled inquisitorial practices . . . in a key respect” and that the 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause should take into account “the 
system of private prosecution” in place when the Bill of Rights was adopted). 
19 Id. at 31. 
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Raleigh.”20 It would be “the worst sort of formalism,” Justice 
Scalia suggested, to make admissibility of a statement hinge on 
how closely it resembled the evidence produced in a Marian 
examination.21 And the Court pushed back when deciding these 
cases, too. Justice Thomas reasoned that neither a 911 call nor 
police questioning at the scene of a domestic disturbance 
sufficiently resembled a Marian examination to be barred by the 
Confrontation Clause: there was no “formalized dialog,” there 
were no Miranda warnings, the declarants were not in custody, 
there were no other “indicia of formality,” and there was “no 
suggestion that the prosecution attempted to offer the . . . hearsay 
evidence at trial in order to evade confrontation.”22 But Justice 
Thomas wrote for himself and in partial dissent. Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the majority cited some eighteenth-century (and 
nineteenth-century) cases, but mostly in support of the notion that 
the Confrontation Clause applied only to “testimonial” statements, 
and not for aid in determining what a testimonial statement was—
or whether, in particular, a 911 call or police questioning at the 
scene of a domestic disturbance counted as testimonial.23 On those 
questions, the Court relied mostly on arguments about what kind 
of rule would be sensible and would fit well with the basic idea 
that a statement was “testimonial” if it was a “substitute for live 
testimony.”24 Responding to Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia 
reasoned that “[i]t imports sufficient formality . . . that lies to 
[police] officers are criminal offenses.”25 But that argument was 
plainly makeshift. The real point was that, in Justice Scalia’s 
words, “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise 
forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its 
extinction.”26 
Giles v. California,27 argued to the Court two years after 
                                                          
20 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32–33. 
21 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 35.  
22 Davis, 547 U.S. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
23 See id. at 824–25 & n.3 (majority opinion). 
24 Id. at 830. 
25 Id. at 830 n.5. 
26 Id. 
27 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
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Davis and Hammon, also concerned statements made to police 
officers responding to a call about domestic violence. Giles was 
charged with murdering his former girlfriend, who had told the 
police three weeks earlier that Giles had attacked her and 
threatened to kill her. The question was whether the 
Confrontation Clause barred the introduction of the out-of-court 
statements even if the judge concluded that, as the indictment 
charged, the declarant’s unavailability was due to the 
defendant’s wrongdoing. Everyone agreed that there was an 
equitable forfeiture exception to the confrontation requirement, 
but the defendant claimed that it should be limited to cases 
where the wrongdoing was aimed at preventing the declarant 
from testifying in court. Oral argument in Giles focused heavily 
on common-law history: the question that received the most 
attention was whether pre-1791 common-law courts would have 
admitted out-of-court accusations on the ground that the 
defendant had procured the accuser’s absence, even though there 
was no proof that the defendant had been motivated by a desire 
to prevent the accuser from testifying.28 Counsel for Giles—and 
Justice Scalia—repeatedly claimed that there were no common-
law cases directly supporting that proposition,29 and counsel for 
the State of California did not disagree; his claim was simply 
that the logic of the common law suggested these accusations 
would apply even when no intent to prevent testimony was 
shown.30  
If the parties in Giles concurred that the resolution of the 
case should turn on eighteenth-century understandings, not 
everyone else was convinced. Professor Richard Friedman, who 
had argued for the defendant in Hammon, filed an amicus brief 
supporting the State of California in Giles; he wanted the Court 
to interpret the confrontation right in a way “that recognizes the 
importance of the right in our system of criminal justice and at 
the same time is practical in administration and does not unduly 
                                                          
28 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Giles, 554 U.S. 353 
(2008) (No. 07-6053). 
29 See id. at 8, 20, 25, 33. 
30 See, e.g., id. at 34–35, 38–40. 
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hamper prosecution of crime.”31 At oral argument in Giles, 
moreover, Justice Breyer tried to get California’s lawyer to 
argue that “maybe we shouldn’t follow completely the common 
law” as it existed in 1791: “maybe we have to assume an intent 
to allow the Confrontation Clause to evolve as the law of 
evidence itself evolves.”32 But even California’s lawyer would 
not go that far; the most he would suggest is that the Court 
should “take account . . . of situations that the common law 
might not have faced or might not have recognized as 
representing a problem of relevant evidence to a crime.”33 
The decision in Giles was as originalist as the argument. The 
Court reaffirmed what it had said in Crawford—that the 
Confrontation Clause should be read “as a reference to the right 
of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions 
established at the time of the founding”34—and, for once, was 
willing to start and end with common law . . . almost. Toward 
the end of his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia suggested 
there would be an uncomfortable element of bootstrapping in 
admitting an out-of-court accusation against a murder defendant 
by the defendant’s alleged victim on the ground that the judge 
believed the defendant was guilty of murdering the victim. But 
this was something of a digression, intended to cast doubt on the 
suggestion that a broad rule of forfeiture would make more 
sense than a narrower rule tied to a purpose behind the 
defendant’s alleged wrongdoing.35 The vast bulk of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion was devoted to an inquiry into the bounds of the 
forfeiture exception at common law before the Confrontation 
Clause was adopted. He was openly scornful, in fact, of the 
suggestion that the Court could recognize new exceptions to the 
confrontation requirement based on the underlying objective of 
the right.36 He lost his majority on this point. Justice Souter and 
                                                          
31 Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 2, Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (No. 07-6053). 
32 Transcript of Oral Argument, Giles, supra note 28, at 34–35. 
33 Id. at 35. 
34 Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 54 (2004)). 
35 Id. at 374. 
36 See id. 
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Justice Ginsburg joined all but that part of Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, and Justice Souter wrote a short concurring opinion, 
joined by Justice Ginsburg, that put more weight on the 
undesirability of a broader rule of forfeiture.37 
Moreover, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice 
Kennedy, argued in dissent in Giles that practicalities weighed 
heavily against the rule adopted by the Court. The dissenters 
thought that the right to confrontation should be forfeited whenever 
the witness’s unavailability was due to the defendant’s misconduct, 
regardless of what the defendant’s purpose had been in killing the 
witness or otherwise making her unavailable. The dissenters argued 
that the most “conclusive” justifications for their position included 
considerations of policy and the “basic purposes and objectives” of 
the confrontation right.38 Nonetheless, even the dissenters felt 
compelled to argue at length about how the forfeiture question 
would be resolved under “17th-, 18th-, and 19th-century law of 
evidence.”39 And two of the justices in the majority signaled an 
inclination to take originalism even further than Justice Scalia. 
Justice Thomas wrote separately to reiterate the view he had 
expressed in Davis, that the Confrontation Clause applied only to 
statements made in a context “sufficiently formal to resemble the 
Marian examinations.”40 Justice Alito said that he, too, was “not 
convinced that the out-of-court statement at issue [in Giles] fell 
within the Confrontation Clause in the first place”; but he joined 
the majority’s analysis because the State of California had conceded 
that question.41 On the whole, therefore, the opinions in Giles were 
highly originalist, just as the argument in that case had been. 
The Court returned to the Confrontation Clause the following 
year in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.42 The question was 
whether prosecutors could introduce a sworn certificate of 
examination from a state forensic chemist who did not testify 
                                                          
37 Id. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
38 Id. at 384, 403 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 390. 
40 Id. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
41 Id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring). 
42 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
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and was not subject to cross-examination; the Court concluded 
this practice was unconstitutional. Unlike the oral argument in 
Giles, the oral argument in Melendez-Diaz was highly focused 
on present-day concerns. History took a back seat. Justice 
Breyer, who had dissented in Giles, made plain at the Melendez-
Diaz oral argument that he was less interested in “what 
happened in the year 1084” than in “what’s a workable rule.”43 
Justice Scalia, in contrast, said that he was “interested in the 
history,” because the point of Crawford was “that the content of 
the Confrontation Clause is not what we would like it to be, but 
what it historically was when it was enshrined in the 
Constitution.”44 But none of the other Justices seemed terribly 
interested in history at the oral argument; the bulk of the 
questioning—including most of Justice Scalia’s questions—
focused on practicalities: how a rule could be formulated, what 
incentives it would create for lawyers and their clients, and how 
burdensome it would be for the government. Counsel for the 
defendant—Professor Jeffrey Fisher, who had also represented 
the defendants in Crawford and in Davis—made no effort to 
steer the discussion back to history and common law. The 
Attorney General of Massachusetts began her argument for the 
State by asserting that the certificates at issue were “official 
records” of “independently verifiable facts” and therefore would 
have been “admissible at common law.”45 A few minutes later 
Justice Souter and then Justice Scalia pressed her on that claim, 
but only briefly.46 The questioning quickly returned to questions 
of administrability, feasibility, the nature of scientific testing, 
and the underlying purposes of the confrontation right. This also 
was the predominant focus of the questioning of the United 
States Assistant Solicitor General, appearing as amicus curiae.47 
The Court split 5-4 in Melendez-Diaz. Justice Scalia wrote 
for the majority, striking down the Massachusetts practice of 
                                                          
43 Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 
(No. 07-591). 
44 Id. at 23. 
45 Id. at 29. 
46 Id. at 33–34. 
47 Id. at 48–58. 
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allowing prosecutors to rely on sworn certificates of analysis 
from chemists who never appeared in court or were subject to 
cross-examination. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Breyer, wrote a sharp dissent, 
complaining that confrontation doctrine was becoming 
“formalistic,” “wooden,” and “pointless.”48 Both opinions 
appealed to pre-1791 common law but spent more time debating 
whether it made sense to distinguish scientific analysts from 
what Justice Kennedy called “ordinary,” “conventional” 
witnesses, who have “personal knowledge of some aspect of the 
defendant’s guilt.”49 The dissent argued that extending the 
confrontation right to scientific analysts gave defendants a 
“windfall . . . unjustified by any demonstrated deficiency in 
trials” and would cause widespread disruption of forensic 
investigations and criminal prosecutions.50 Justice Kennedy 
contended that framing-era common law supported exempting 
lab analysts from the Confrontation Clause. He analogized 
forensic scientists to copyists, whose affidavits that their copies 
were true and accurate “were accepted without hesitation” by 
common-law courts, even when the affidavits were prepared 
specifically for use in a criminal prosecution.51 But this was a 
relatively small part of his argument. Most of his argument had 
to do with what kind of rule made most sense on grounds of 
policy, balancing the defendant’s legitimate interests against the 
burdens placed on courts, prosecutors, and analysts. 
Perhaps as a consequence, Justice Scalia devoted much of his 
majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz to arguing that giving 
defendants a right to confront forensic analysts in court would 
be neither disruptive nor prohibitively expensive, and that the 
confrontation would help defendants protect themselves against 
fraudulent, misleading, or mistaken laboratory results. He also 
spent time arguing about common-law precedents, maintaining 
that the closest analogs to forensic lab reports at common law 
were not copyists’ affidavits but “a clerk’s certificate attesting to 
                                                          
48 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544, 2547 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
49 Id. at 2543. 
50 Id. at 2549–50. 
51 Id. at 2552–53. 
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the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant 
record and failed to find it”—certificates that Justice Scalia said 
were admissible only if the clerk was “subject to 
confrontation.”52 But the points on which Justice Scalia placed 
most emphasis in Melendez-Diaz—the points with which he 
began his opinion for the Court and the points to which he 
returned at the end of the opinion—had to do with what Justice 
Scalia took to be the basic logic of Crawford, that statements 
prepared as substitutes for testimony cannot be admitted against 
a criminal defendant without an opportunity for confrontation.53 
The Court’s most recent confrontation cases are Michigan v. 
Bryant54 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,55 each of which was 
argued and decided in the October 2010 term. The question in 
Bryant was whether Crawford and Davis allowed the 
introduction in a homicide trial of statements the victim made 
after he was shot to police officers who responded to the scene 
(the Court answered yes); the question in Bullcoming was 
whether Melendez-Diaz permitted the prosecution to introduce a 
forensic report based on machine-generated lab results if the 
analyst who prepared the report did not appear in court, but 
another analyst from the laboratory did (the Court said no). 
Aside from scattered references to the prosecution of Sir Walter 
Raleigh when Bryant was argued before the Court,56 common 
law played little role in the oral argument of either of these 
cases. Professor Jeffrey Fisher, representing Bullcoming, started 
his oral argument by appealing to the “text, purpose, and history 
of the Confrontation Clause,”57 but then spent virtually all of his 
time arguing how the purposes of the confrontation guarantee 
could best be furthered and a workable and administrable 
doctrinal line drawn. This was the focus of the argument in 
Bryant as well, notwithstanding the references to Raleigh’s case. 
                                                          
52 Id. at 2539 (majority opinion). 
53 See id. at 2531–32, 2542. 
54 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
55 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
56 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, 32, 36, 49, Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 
1143 (No. 09-150). 
57 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 
09-10876). 
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Common law was a minor theme of the opinions in these 
cases, too. Perhaps this was because these were the first 
significant confrontation cases the Court has decided since 
Crawford in which Justice Scalia did not write for the Court. 
Justice Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion in Bryant, and 
Justice Scalia was in dissent. Justice Scalia was part of the 
majority in Bullcoming, but Justice Ginsburg wrote the Court’s 
opinion. Even Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Bryant, 
though, focused more on the purposes of the confrontation 
guarantee, and the administrability of the line drawn by the 
Court, than on the intricacies of pre-1791 common law. This 
was also the focus of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in 
Bullcoming, which Justice Scalia joined. 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a short, separate dissent in Bryant. 
She agreed with Justice Scalia that the victim’s statements in that 
case were “testimonial” and therefore the Court was wrong to 
find them admissible without confrontation. Justice Ginsburg 
also drew attention, though, to the fact that pre-1791 common 
law allowed certain “dying declarations” to be admitted against 
homicide defendants, notwithstanding the absence of 
confrontation. That issue had not been preserved by the 
prosecutors in Bryant, but Justice Ginsburg suggested that in a 
case where the issue had been preserved, the Court should 
consider whether the Confrontation Clause incorporated the 
“dying declaration” exception and what its contours were.58 
Nonetheless, for Justice Ginsburg as for the rest of the Court, 
the major concerns in Bryant and Bullcoming seemed to be 
doctrinal and pragmatic, not historical. 
II. 
Crawford was argued looking forwards and decided looking 
backwards. Davis and Hammon were argued looking backwards 
and decided looking forwards. Giles was argued looking 
                                                          
58 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court had 
suggested in Giles, and in Crawford itself, that the “dying declaration” 
exception might indeed be incorporated into the constitutional guarantee of 
confrontation. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358, 362 (2008); 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004). 
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backwards and decided looking backwards. Melendez-Diaz was 
argued looking forwards, mainly, and decided looking forwards, 
mainly. So were Bryant and Bullcoming, only more so. 
Sometimes the advocates focus on common law, sometimes on 
concerns of practicality, administrability, and fundamental 
purposes. The same goes for the Court. Sometimes the lawyers 
are on the same page as the Justices, sometimes not. 
All of this might be thought unremarkable. Everyone knows 
that judging is an eclectic enterprise, combining attention to 
prior decisions and drafters’ intentions with assessments of 
workability, social costs and benefits, and underlying rationales. 
It is to be expected that certain of these considerations will 
receive greater emphasis at one time, other considerations at 
another time.  
Besides, it oversimplifies matters to look only at oral 
arguments. Each of the Court’s recent confrontation cases was 
briefed not just by the parties but by amici, and the briefs 
reliably argued from a range of perspectives. In each of these 
cases, some briefs gave close attention to history and common 
law, others raised arguments about the underlying purpose of 
confrontation, and still others focused on concerns of practicality 
and administrability. Most of the briefs, of course, were 
themselves eclectic in the kinds of arguments they raised. 
So one way to understand the nature of the argumentation in 
the confrontation cases is this: lots of different kinds of 
arguments were made in each case, some backward-looking and 
some forward-looking. Inevitably, certain arguments wound up 
getting a disproportionate amount of attention at oral argument. 
There is a limited amount of time for oral argument, and the 
entire range of considerations raised in the briefs cannot be 
canvassed. So the questioning winds up focusing on arguments 
that, for one reason or another, strike one or more Justices as 
particularly strong, particularly weak, particularly confusing, or 
particularly interesting. Those may or may not wind up being 
the points on which the Court leans most heavily when deciding 
the case. But just because a consideration gets less emphasis at 
oral argument, or in the Court’s written decision, does not mean 
the Court is neglecting it. There is a dialectic in these cases, as 
in all cases the Court decides: a back-and-forth consideration of, 
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say, history on the one hand and policy on the other. There is 
nothing nefarious or troubling about the fact that different kinds 
of arguments seem more compelling, or more worthy of 
discussion, in different cases or at different times. 
In fact, the process can be advantageous: policy 
considerations and appeals to history can operate as useful 
checks on each other. That is one way to read the progression 
from Crawford to Davis: the Court confronted what Crawford’s 
originalism would look like if taken to an extreme, and (except 
for Justice Thomas) refused to go that far. Instead, a majority of 
the Court, led by Justice Scalia, seemed to decide in Davis that 
the Confrontation Clause needed to be read with enough 
flexibility to keep it relevant. 
But much, if not most, of the methodological back-and-forth 
in the recent confrontation cases has operated less helpfully. It 
has taken the form of a kind of rhetorical kabuki, making the 
Court’s reasoning harder to pin down, harder to argue with, 
harder—in a word—to confront. The Court claims that it is 
bound by the original understanding of the Confrontation 
Clause, that the clause was originally understood to codify 
eighteenth-century common law, and that therefore the Court 
must follow the rules of eighteenth-century common law, no 
matter how inconvenient or unjust those rules may now seem. 
That way of framing the issues suggests that inquiries into 
fairness and practicality are irrelevant, except perhaps as 
evidence about what eighteenth-century common law is likely to 
have required. But the Court repeatedly acts as though fairness 
and practicality matter in their own right. Indeed, the Court 
often acts—especially at oral argument—as though fairness and 
practicality are what matter most. Sometimes common law 
trumps considerations of policy, but sometimes it seems to be 
the other way around. 
It is possible, of course, that the Court has consistently taken 
account of both original intent and present-day practicalities 
when interpreting the Confrontation Clause. Perhaps the Court 
has tried, in each of its recent confrontation cases, to read the 
Sixth Amendment in a way that strikes a kind of equilibrium 
between historical fidelity and its own assessment of the dictates 
of fairness and practicality. There might not be anything wrong 
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with that. Lots of people think that the Court should, and maybe 
even must, approach the Constitution in this way: balancing 
different methodologies against each other, sacrificing purity for 
a rough, incompletely theorized kind of common sense. Other 
people, including at times some members of the Court, are 
skeptical of that kind of multi-factored analysis, finding it too 
manipulable and indeterminate. 
But that debate can be put to one side. Regardless of whether 
it makes sense for the Court to try to balance originalism and 
pragmatism on a case-by-case basis, there is little to be said for 
making the attempt and not admitting it. If you say that history 
matters, but that fairness and accuracy matter, too, and that both 
kinds of considerations will be taken into account, then you can 
no longer dismiss considerations of either kind as ultimately 
beside the point. You can be held responsible, too, for the 
particular way in which you combine considerations of history 
with considerations of present-day practicalities. And you 
commit yourself to defending your interpretative methods in all 
of their particulars: your reliance on history (to whatever degree 
you rely on it, and in whatever manner), the weight you put on 
considerations of justice, fairness, and practicality, and the way 
in which you combine these disparate considerations and—
crucially—resolve any conflicts between them. If, on the other 
hand, you insist at times that what really matters is history, and 
you act at other times as though what really matters is present-
day practicality, then you brush aside arguments about history 
by talking about fairness and what makes sense, and you belittle 
arguments about fairness and what makes sense by retreating to 
history. The food was fine, what there was of it; there was 
plenty, such as it was. 
 
